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MuLtIPLE uNIVERSES  
AND OBSERVAtION  
SELEctION EffEctS
Darren Bradley
the fine-tuning argument can be used to 
support the Many universe hypothesis. the 
Inverse Gambler’s fallacy objection seeks to 
undercut the support for the Many universe 
hypothesis. the objection is that although the 
evidence that there is life somewhere confirms 
Many universes, the specific evidence that 
there is life in this universe does not. I will 
argue that the Inverse Gambler’s fallacy is 
not committed by the fine-tuning argument. 
the key issue is the procedure by which the 
universe with life is selected for observation. 
Once we take account of the procedure, we 
find that the support for the Many universe 
hypothesis remains.1
Selection Effects
 Whenever a sample is drawn from a popu-
lation, some particular method must be used. 
Eddington’s (1939) classic example involves 
fishing with a net. If we catch a sample of fish 
from a lake, and all the fish in the sample are 
bigger than six inches, this appears to confirm 
the hypothesis that all the fish in the lake are 
bigger than six inches. But if we then find out 
that the net used cannot catch anything smaller 
than six inches due to the size of its holes, 
the hypothesis is no longer confirmed. Or, at 
least, not as much. So the inference depends 
on the method of obtaining the sample. call 
the method by which the sample was selected 
the selection procedure. there are an indefinite 
number of selection procedures, but there are 
only two that we will need.
 A random procedure is one where each 
member of the population has an equal 
chance of being selected for the sample. In 
Eddington’s example, this would be a case 
where each fish in the lake has an equal 
chance of being caught.
 A biased procedure is one where only 
members with a certain property are selected 
for the sample. (this is a precisification of 
our ordinary language term “biased.” It cor-
responds better to “maximally biased.”) In 
Eddington’s example the selection procedure 
is biased (in my new technical sense) toward 
the property of being more than six inches.
 Let’s consider a simple thought-experiment 
that models the selection effects of the fine-
tuning argument. Suppose an urn contains 
either one ball or two, depending on the result 
of a fair coin toss (two if tails, one if Heads). 
Each ball that goes in the urn will be either 
big or small. Which it will be depends on the 
result of another fair coin toss.
 A sample of one is taken. It turns out  
  to be small. 
 E = A small ball is selected. 
 Does E confirm tails?
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 It depends on the procedure by which the 
ball has been selected. consider two proce-
dures for how a ball might be selected for a 
sample. first, a small hole might be opened, 
allowing one of the small balls out of the urn 
and into the sample. this procedure is biased 
toward the property of being small. Second, a 
large hole might be opened that allows any of 
the balls out of the urn and into the sample. 
this procedure is random. Let’s work through 
these two possibilities.
Biased Procedure
 Assume first that a small hole is opened 
so that the procedure is biased toward small-
ness. Say that E confirms t iff P(t|E) > P(t) 
(Salmon 1975) and let
H = Heads
t = tails
E = A small ball is selected.
As the procedure is biased, a small ball will 
be observed whenever a small ball exists (oth-
erwise nothing will be observed). the prob-
ability that a small ball exists given Heads is 
1/2 (recall that it depends on the toss of a fair 
coin). the probability that a small ball exists 
given tails is 3/4, because there is a second 
ball that might be small. tails is confirmed, 
as the evidence was more likely given tails 
(3/4) than Heads (1/2). this result can be 
shown using Bayes’ theorem:
is successfully found, the evidence confirms 
hypotheses in which there is a large popula-
tion (rather than a small one).2
Random Procedure
 Now suppose a large hole is opened. then, 
no matter how many balls there are, there 
is a probability of 1/2 of a small ball being 
observed, as each ball has a ½ chance of 
being small. So neither Heads nor tails is 
confirmed.
 When the procedure was biased, P(E|t) 
was ¾, as the extra ball increased the chance 
that a small ball would be in the urn. But now 
that a ball is selected at random, the extra ball 
makes it no more likely that a small ball will 
be observed. So P(E|t) = 1/2.
 Again, this is shown by Bayes’ theorem:
the heuristic here is that if the procedure 
is random with respect to p, then finding an 
instantiation of p doesn’t confirm any hypoth-
esis regarding the size of the population.3
 the relevance of the selection procedure 
is easy to miss because in both cases the 
evidence looks the same. In both cases the 
evidence can naturally be described as “A 
small ball is selected.” But the process by 
which the ball is selected affects the infer-
ences we can draw and our total evidence 
must include this.4
 the two-stage procedure is at the heart of 
observation selection effects. first is the pro-
cess by which the nature of the population is 
determined. call this the ontic process. In the 
above case, the ontic process results in there 
being either one or two balls, of particular 
sizes, in the urn. then there is the process 
by which we come to observe a particular 
there is a useful heuristic: if the procedure 
is biased toward p, and an instantiation of p 
 Ball 1 Ball 2
Heads Big or small —
Tails Big or small Big or small
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ball. call this the epistemic process. this 
point about needing a two-stage procedure 
is a general one, and is discussed in detail by 
Hutchison (1999). to take our total evidence 
into account, we need to conditionalize on 
“I have learned E by process p,” as opposed 
to just “E.” I will argue that when the selec-
tion procedure is included in the fine-tuning 
argument, support for the Many universe 
hypothesis remains.
the fine-tuning Argument
 If the fundamental constants of the universe 
had been much different from their actual val-
ues, life could not have existed. for example, 
if gravity had been a bit stronger, the universe 
would have collapsed in on itself moments 
after the big bang. If it had been a bit weaker, 
the universe would have flown apart so fast that 
molecules could never have been formed. the 
same holds for nearly all the other fundamental 
constants (see McMullin 1993). (the initial 
conditions are also vital. for ease of exposi-
tion, I will take “right constants” to include 
right initial conditions.) the existence of every 
living thing in the universe is balanced on a 
knife-edge.5 Nevertheless, life exists.
 Proponents of the fine-tuning argument 
claim that the existence of life requires an 
explanation.6 One explanation is that there are 
many universes, and that these universes have 
fundamental constants with different values 
spread out across the parameter space. this is 
a hypothesis that has been independently sug-
gested several times, from Misner, thorne, 
and Wheeler’s (1973) oscillating universes 
to Susskind’s (2005) Landscape hypothesis.
 Not all versions of these theories entail that 
the other universes have different constants 
spread out across the parameter space, but I 
am interested in the versions in which they do. 
this restriction might reduce the prior prob-
ability of the hypothesis, but that doesn’t af-
fect my argument, which is about whether the 
hypothesis is confirmed by the evidence.
 How does the evidence that the universe 
has the right constants for life confirm the 
hypothesis that there are many universes? the 
argument is very intuitive. the more trials of 
some kind of event there are, the greater the 
probability of any given outcome occurring. 
for example, the probability that at least one 
double six is rolled given one throw of a die 
is 1/36. However, if the die is thrown again, 
the probability of at least one double six being 
rolled is higher (over 1/20 instead of 1/36). So 
the evidence that at least one double six has 
been rolled is more likely given that the die 
is thrown a second time. thus, the evidence 
that a double six has been rolled confirms the 
hypothesis that the dice have been thrown a 
second time.7
 Similar reasoning applies to universes. 
consider the following two hypotheses:
Many universe Hypothesis (MV): there are 
many universes with different values of con-
stants.
universe Hypothesis (uV): there is only one 
universe.
the analogy to the dice cases is straightfor-
ward. Replace the dice throws with universes, 
and replace the result of getting a double six 
on a throw with getting a universe with the 
right constants for life. the probability of 
there being life given only one universe is 
very small. But if there are enough universes, 
the probability that there exists one with the 
right constants for life becomes very high. 
thus, the evidence that there is at least one 
universe with the right constants for life 
confirms the hypothesis that there are many 
universes. Let’s formalize the argument.
 Let the proposition that at least one universe 
has the right constants for life be E. Let the 
probability that any given universe has the 
right constants for life be b. Let uV mean 
there is one universe and MV mean there are 
two universes. Assume equal priors (nothing 
turns on their value):
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P(uV) = 1/2
P(MV) = 1/2
We can calculate how much learning E dis-
confirms the universe Hypothesis, uV.8
As b → 1, P(uV|E) → 1/2
As b → 0, P(uV|E) → 1/3
If b = 1, the evidence E becomes certain. So 
uV is not confirmed and keeps its prior value 
of 1/2. As b falls, the degree of confirmation 
of MV goes up, until we reach maximal 
values of P(uV|E) = 1/3 and P(MV|E) = 
2/3 as b approaches 0. this gets us to the 
conclusion of the fine-tuning argument, that 
E confirms MV.
 Note that MV is only confirmed if the prior 
probability of E—that at least one universe 
has the right constants for life—is less than 
one. Sober (2003) contests this assumption on 
the grounds that we could not have discov-
ered a universe with the wrong constants for 
life. Similarly, he thinks that if you survive 
a firing squad, you do not gain evidence that 
they intended to miss. Nor, according to So-
ber’s position, do you gain evidence that the 
guns jammed, or that they contained blanks, 
figure 1: the fine-tuning Argument
or anything else that might explain your 
survival. this position strikes me as highly 
implausible. 9
 Analogies aside, I think Sober’s objec-
tion is answered by Monton (2005), who 
assimilates the problem to the problem of 
old evidence (Glymour 1980). If we in-
clude everything we know at time t in the 
background evidence, then none of these 
facts known at time t can confirm anything 
according to standard Bayesian confirma-
tion theory.10 So “at least one universe has 
the right constants for life” can’t confirm 
anything if it is already known when we start 
our Bayesian calculations. But it is generally 
acknowledged that Bayeisan confirmation 
theory gives us the wrong result in such 
cases, and must be modified to allow old 
evidence to confirm hypotheses. Monton 
applies the standard counterfactual solution 
(Howson 1991) to generate the result that 
the relevant prior probability that at least 
one universe has the right constants for life 
is less than 1.
 Henceforth, I will assume that the prior 
probability that at least one universe has the 
right constants for life is less than 1. It is 
important to be clear about this assumption, 
which will be explicitly invoked in the sec-
tion titled “White: the converse Selection 
Effect.”
P(uV | E) = P(uV)P(E | uV)/
[P(uV)P(E | uV) + P(MV)(P(E | MV)]
= (1 / 2b)/[(1 / 2)b + (1/2)(1 – (1 – b)2)]
= 1/(3 – b)
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 So for the duration of the paper, I ask that 
you suspend your belief that you exist, or that 
there is any universe that has the right con-
stants for life, and consider the possibility that 
there isn’t. It might be somewhat disconcert-
ing to consider such a possibility, but I think 
it is a perfectly coherent modal thought, and 
the costs of dismissing it are high.
Hacking: the Inverse  
Gambler’s fallacy
 Hacking’s objection is that the fine-tuning 
argument commits a mistake he dubs the 
inverse gambler’s fallacy (Hacking 1987). 
to explain this, we can start with the familiar 
gambler’s fallacy.
Gambler’s Fallacy. to think that a certain out-
come on a gambling device is more likely to 
occur on a particular trial after a series of earlier 
trials on which that outcome did not occur.
this fallacy is committed by someone who 
thinks that a run of non-double sixes increases 
the probability that the next roll will be a dou-
ble six. the Inverse Gambler’s fallacy makes a 
similar mistake, but in the other direction.
Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy. to think that a cer-
tain outcome on a particular trial makes it more 
likely that other trials have taken place.
Hacking demonstrates this fallacy with the 
following example. this example, and the 
variants that follow, all have the same back-
ground:
Background: A pair of dice are to be thrown 
either one time (u) or a million times (M); 
you don’t know which, and you must assess 
whether you have learned evidence for either 
hypothesis.
case H (Hacking): you walk into the room just 
before a throw takes place, and you observe the 
outcome. A double six comes up.
 Selection procedure is M is confirmed?
Case H (Hacking) Random No
table 1
In this case, M is not confirmed. Hacking cor-
rectly points out that someone who thinks M 
is confirmed would be committing the Inverse 
Gambler’s fallacy. But why is it a fallacy? 
Hacking’s diagnosis of the mistake being 
made is that you have the specific evidence 
that this throw is a double six, and how things 
are on this throw is independent of how many 
other throws there might be. He claims that 
the general evidence that “at least one double 
six has been rolled” would confirm M, but the 
specific evidence that “this roll is a double 
six” doesn’t confirm M.
 Hacking then argues that the same applies 
in the cosmology case. Our total evidence is 
that this universe has the right constants for 
life, and how things are with this universe 
is independent of how many universes there 
might be. So finding that this universe has 
the right constants for life doesn’t confirm 
Many universes.
 But I think Hacking has misdiagnosed the 
root of the Inverse Gambler’s fallacy. What 
matters is not the specificity of the evidence, 
as Hacking claims, but the epistemic process 
by which it was found. to see this, compare 
what happens when we change the process, 
as McGrath (1988) does in his variation (with 
the same background that a dice will be tossed 
either one or a million times):
case G (McGrath): you take a nap and instruct 
that you be woken only if a double six comes 
up. you are woken and observe a double six.
In this case M is confirmed by the evidence.11 
But this should be puzzling, as it looks like 
Hacking can make the same objection. We 
again have the specific evidence that this roll 
is a double six. Rigidly designate the roll you 
observe as Alpha
t
. your total evidence is that 
Alpha
t
 is a double six. Shouldn’t this specific 
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evidence be independent of M? Doesn’t fo-
cusing on the specific evidence show that the 
Inverse Gambler’s fallacy is still being com-
mitted, just as it was in Hacking’s case H?
 No. the difference is due to the fact that 
the process is now biased toward double 
sixes. Recall the heuristic: if the process is 
biased toward p, and an instantiation of p is 
successfully found, the evidence confirms 
hypotheses in which there is a large popula-
tion rather than a small one. So observing a 
double six does confirm M. We’ll go through 
this in detail in a moment.
 the failure of confirmation in case H is not 
caused by the specificity of the evidence, but 
by the process by which the evidence was 
found. the evidence fails to confirm M be-
cause the throw was selected for observation 
by a process that was random with respect to 
double sixes. you walked into the room and 
were just as likely to observe a double six 
as any other outcome. the heuristic is that 
if the procedure is random with respect to 
p, then finding an instantiation of p doesn’t 
confirm any hypothesis regarding the size of 
the population. So observing a double six 
doesn’t confirm M.
 Let’s go through exactly why M is con-
firmed in G, using the two-stage procedure. 
first, the ontic stage ensures that Alpha
t
 is 
more likely to exist if there are a million 
rolls. for example, Alpha
t 
might be the 50th 
roll, which would only exist if there are a 
million throws. Or it might be the roll, if any, 
on which the dice rotated exactly 6.94851 
times combined. this too is more likely to 
exist if there are a million rolls. Second, the 
epistemic stage ensures that Alpha
t
 is more 
likely to be observed than other throws be-
cause Alpha
t
 is a double six, and the biased 
 Selection procedure is M is confirmed?
Case H (Hacking) Random No
Case G (McGrath) Biased towards double six yes
table 2
procedure ensures that only double sixes are 
observed.
 So we see that, contra Hacking, the spe-
cificity of the evidence is not the issue, but 
the process by which it is found. Specific 
evidence found by a biased process still con-
firms M. Similarly, general evidence (i.e., 
some double six is rolled) found by a random 
process does not confirm M.
 We can apply this analysis to the cosmology 
case. Rigidly designate this universe as Alpha. 
Do the two conditions needed for confirma-
tion of Many universes hold? they do. first, 
does the Many universe hypothesis make 
the existence of our universe, Alpha, more 
likely? yes. A universe is Alpha in virtue of 
its properties. the more universes there are, 
the more likely that a universe with Alpha’s 
properties, i.e., Alpha, exists.12 (Recall we are 
considering versions of the Many universe 
hypothesis according to which the different 
universes have different constants.)
 Second, by what procedure has our uni-
verse, Alpha, been selected for observa-
tion? Alpha is more likely to be observed 
than other universes because Alpha has the 
right constants, and only universes with the 
right constants can be observed.13 We have 
successfully found a universe with the right 
constants by a biased method, so we end up 
with confirmation of Many universes. the 
fine-tuning argument survives Hacking’s 
objection.
 this completes my main argument.14 In 
the next section I argue that White’s (2000) 
development of Hacking’s objection doesn’t 
succeed on its own terms. then, in the final 
section, I argue that even if it did succeed, it 
would be dialectically ineffective against the 
fine-tuning argument.
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White: the converse  
Selection Effect
 White doesn’t deny any part of the argu-
ment I give above, so we need to be clear 
about the dialectic. My argument relies on 
the premise that we could only have existed 
in a universe with the right constants for life.15 
White attacks the assumption that we could 
have existed in any old universe with the 
right constants for life, i.e., if some universe 
other than Alpha had the right constants for 
life, we could have existed in that universe. 
Although this assumption isn’t technically 
necessary for the fine-tuning argument, I 
think it is true, and that it is the right way to 
think about fine-tuning. So I will defend this 
assumption in this section. then I will show 
how the fine-tuning argument can be applied 
even if the assumption is denied.
 So could we have existed in some universe 
other than Alpha that happened to have the 
right constants? White suggests that we could 
not have. He does not accept that McGrath’s 
case G is analogous to our position with 
respect to cosmology, and suggests the fol-
lowing analogy instead:
case W (White): you and an unspecified num-
ber of sleepers have a unique partner who will 
roll two dice. Each sleeper will be woken if and 
only if her partner rolls a double six. you are 
woken and observe a double six.
you have no evidence that confirms M in 
case W. this is because the process in W is 
not biased toward double sixes, it is biased 
toward your roll being a double six. that is, 
the only thing you could observe is that your 
roll is a double six. So the possible existence 
of other rolls becomes independent of your 
being woken, and M is not confirmed.
 White holds that to get confirmation of M, 
you must be more likely to be woken given 
that rolls other than Alpha
t
 exist than if no 
roll other than Alpha
t
 exists. White calls this 
the converse selection effect.
converse selection effect (Dice): If some roll 
other than Alpha
t
 exists then you are more 
likely to be woken than if no roll other than 
Alpha
t
 exists.
the same principle applies to the cosmology 
case:
converse selection effect (cosmology): If some 
universe other than Alpha exists, then we are 
more likely to exist than if no universe other 
than Alpha exists.
White claims that there is no converse selec-
tion effect in the cosmology case. If some 
universe other than Alpha existed, would it 
mean you were more likely to exist than if 
it didn’t?
 It seems to me that you would be more 
likely to exist. Keep in mind that we cannot 
assume as background knowledge that there 
is any universe with the right constants for 
life or that you exist at all. (Recall the earlier 
discussion of Sober.) So let’s ask: what would 
be required for you to exist? Presumably cer-
tain features of the universe would have to be 
arranged in a very specific way. for example, 
we might need a planet with water, a race of 
creatures with a certain history and culture, 
and so forth. Surely such conditions could 
have been satisfied in a different universe. 
Or perhaps instead my existence requires 
the actual matter of which my brain consists, 
 Selection procedure is M is confirmed?
Case H (Hacking) Random No
Case G (McGrath) Biased towards double six yes
Case W (White) Biased towards your roll No 
 being double six
table 3
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or perhaps my existence requires the instan-
tiation of some simple irreducible property. 
couldn’t any of these conditions have been 
satisfied in a different universe? for any given 
universe the probability that such conditions 
be satisfied is small. But nevertheless, for 
each universe that exists, the probability that 
the relevant condition is satisfied goes up, so 
the probability that you exist goes up.
 White disagrees. His discussion is very 
compressed, but I can find two arguments. the 
main argument seems to be the following:
We have no reason to suppose that we would 
exist if a different universe had been fine-tuned. 
In order for the Multiple universe hypothesis to 
render our existence more probable, there must 
be some mechanism analogous to that in [case 
G] linking the multiplicity of universes with 
our existence. But there is no such mechanism. 
(White 2000, p.269)
the idea seems to be that we have no reason 
to think we would exist in a different universe, 
because there is no mechanism connecting 
that other universe with our existence. It is 
unclear to me exactly what White means by 
“mechanism” and what he demands of it. (He 
doesn’t use the word anywhere else in the 
paper.) It’s true that we don’t have the same 
kind of mechanism as we do in case G, i.e., 
someone deliberately influencing what you 
can observe. But we surely don’t need any-
thing like that to get confirmation. We don’t 
need a particular reason to think we would 
exist in a different universe, we just need the 
possibility that we could have.
 this leads us to White’s second argument—
that we could not have existed in a different 
universe. Why think we couldn’t have ex-
isted in a different universe? One could use 
Kripke’s (1980) necessity of origins thesis to 
claim that it is metaphysically impossible for 
us to have existed in any other universe. But 
necessity of origins with respect to universes 
is implausible, and White does not endorse it. 
(Even if I could not have been produced by 
any other parents, why couldn’t my parents, 
and theirs . . . have existed in a different uni-
verse? See Manson and thrush 2003 for this 
response.) So what arguments does White 
give for denying that we could have existed 
in a different universe?
 He points out that a particular qualitative 
state cannot be sufficient for our existence. 
this is because there might be two universes 
in the same qualitative state, and we cannot 
exist in both.16 I agree, but this is not to the 
point. We don’t need to claim that a qualita-
tive state of a universe is sufficient for our 
existence. We just need to claim that the 
conditions that are sufficient for our exist-
ence might be instantiated in universes other 
than Alpha.
 White’s point would be relevant if it was 
taken as given that we exist in Alpha. then, 
of course, we couldn’t exist in any other 
universe. But we cannot assume we exist at 
all, let alone that we exist in Alpha.
 the same point holds in case G (where you 
are woken if a double six is rolled). Stipulate 
that you are to be woken no more than once. 
Given that you are woken on roll Alpha
t
, there 
is no possibility that you are woken on any 
other roll. But being woken on roll Alpha
t
 
is not something we should hold fixed when 
assessing the counterfactual “I could have 
been woken on a different roll.”
 White has given no convincing argument 
that we couldn’t have existed in another uni-
verse, and it seems plausible to me that we 
could have. If so, the converse selection effect 
holds and the Many universe hypothesis is 
confirmed by the evidence of a universe with 
the right constants.
Why the fine-tuning Argument 
Works Even If there Is No 
converse Selection Effect
 It turns out that a converse selection effect 
is not needed for the evidence to confirm 
Many universes. All we need is for the 
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selection procedure to be biased. Let’s as-
sume necessity of origins with respect to 
universes; then we could only exist in this 
universe, Alpha. Instead of the process be-
ing biased toward finding the property of 
[being a universe with the right constants for 
life], the process is biased toward finding the 
property of being Alpha. Whereas before, the 
selection procedure resulted in us observing 
some universe with the right constants for 
life (or observing nothing), now the selection 
procedure results in our observing Alpha (or 
observing nothing). It turns out that if we 
successfully observe Alpha, we have confir-
mation for the Many universe hypothesis. 
We just run through the fine-tuning argument, 
substituting “Alpha” for “a universe with the 
right constants for life.”
 Recall the two-stage procedure. the first 
stage is that if there are Many universes, there 
is a greater chance that Alpha will exist (same 
as before). At the second stage, necessity of 
origins tells us that we could only observe 
Alpha. So the process is biased toward the 
property of being Alpha. A property has been 
successfully found by a biased procedure, so 
observing Alpha confirms Many universes.
 In fact we get a bigger shift than before if 
we assume necessity of origins. Previously, 
we could have existed in any universe with 
the right constants for life. We weren’t picky. 
On the assumption of necessity of origins, 
we are maximally picky. there is only one 
universe in which we could possibly exist. 
If that universe doesn’t exist, we don’t exist. 
If we find, lo and behold, that our universe 
does exists, then Many universes is strongly 
confirmed.
 Extending the notation from earlier, let 
b represent the probability that a given 
universe has the property the procedure is 
biased toward. We saw that the degree of 
confirmation of Many universes rises as 
b falls. Given necessity of origins, b is the 
property of being Alpha. Assuming that the 
probability that [a given universe is Alpha] 
is smaller than the probability that [a given 
universe has the right constants for life], 
necessity of origins results in greater con-
firmation for Many universes.
 Let’s give one final dice case to model 
this.
case N (for necessity): Suppose you know you 
are one of a million people who is paired with a 
million possible dice rolls. If the dice are rolled 
once (u), then only the individual paired with 
that roll is taken to the lab, allowed to take a 
nap, and woken if his roll is a double six. If 
the dice are rolled a million times (M), all one 
million people are taken to the lab and allowed 
to take a nap, and each is woken if his roll is a 
double six. you find yourself taken to the lab, 
you take a nap, and you are woken to observe 
a double six.
 Selection procedure is M is confirmed?
Case H (Hacking) Random No
Case G (McGrath) Biased towards yes  
 double six
case W (White) Biased towards your  No 
 roll being double six
Case N (Necessity) Biased towards your yes 
 possible roll being  
 double six
table 4
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Is M confirmed? yes. It is not confirmed by 
the fact that your throw is a double six. It 
is confirmed by the fact that you have been 
taken to the lab in the first place. Similarly, 
given necessity of origins, Many universes is 
not confirmed by the fact that Alpha has the 
right constants for life, but by the fact that Al-
pha exists at all,17 together with the procedure 
by which that fact was discovered.
conclusion
 the procedure by which a piece of evi-
dence came to be learned is always relevant 
to the conclusions we can draw. the Inverse 
Gambler’s fallacy objection rightly draws 
our attention to the procedure by which our 
universe was observed. I have argued that 
when the procedure is taken into account, the 
fine-tuned nature of the universe confirms the 
Many universe hypothesis.18 
University of British Columbia
NOtES
1. the main contenders to explain fine-tuning are Many universes and Intelligent Design. to the 
extent that my argument supports Many universes, it undercuts the argument for Intelligent Design.
2.	 two caveats. first, we must assume at least (a) that the size of the population is independent of 
the distribution of objects, and (b) that p might not have been instantiated. these will hold in all our 
cases. Second, there are some selection procedures that satisfy our definition of bias, but for which the 
heuristic doesn’t hold; for example, the procedure that selects a single object at random, and reports 
nothing if that object doesn’t have the desired property. But this will be ignored as it is implausible that 
our observation of this universe could be modeled by such a strange procedure.
3.	 Again assuming, at least, that the size is independent of the distribution of properties and that p is 
not certain to be instantiated. If p is certain to be instantiated, the small hypothesis is confirmed.
4. I have left open whether knowledge about the process should be included in background knowledge 
or new evidence. this may vary from one agent to another, but won’t affect the final result of the update, 
as learning E1 followed by E2 is equivalent to learning E1 & E2. 
5.	 I have found that some philosophers are hostile to this claim for reasons I find puzzling; physicists 
seem to take the claim as data. See colyvan et al. (2005) for a technical argument that it is not improb-
able that the universe be fine-tuned, and Monton’s (2005) response.
6.	 these proponents include craig (1988), Leslie (1989), Swinburne (1990), van Inwagen (1993), 
Manson (1998), and Parfit (1998). Sober (2003) objects that no such explanation is needed. I will discuss 
his objection at the end of the section.
7.	 the procedure in this case is biased toward double sixes. this is the default assumption in such 
examples involving conditional probability, which is how I could explain the case without mentioning 
procedures; it is generally assumed that if E is true, E is discovered. the procedure is also biased in the 
cosmology case that follows; that the procedure is biased is the key premise of this paper’s argument. 
Note that randomness is the default assumption in statistics. I suspect this interesting divergence, which 
I have never seen commented on, is largely responsible for the current disagreement. See Hutchison 
(1999) for a detailed discussion of bias as related to conditional probability.
8.	 these calculations are structurally identical to those in the Generalized Sleeping Beauty problem 
(White 2006). I develop the close connection between these and other self-location problems else-
where.
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9.	 Sober has recently changed his mind. See Sober (forthcoming).
10.	this is because P(H|E) = P(H) if P(E)=1.
11.	If the dice are thrown once, the probability you are woken is 1/6. If the dice are thrown a million 
times, the probability you are woken is 1–(5/6)^1000000, which according to my calculator is 1.
12.	could one deny that more universes make Alpha more likely to exist? One could argue that Alpha 
necessarily exists, or that if any universes exist, then Alpha does. I don’t think such a position would 
be plausible.
13.	What if we could have existed in a universe with the wrong constants due to some freak coincidence? 
Many universes would still be confirmed by our existence. All we need is that we are more likely to 
observe a universe with the right constants than with the wrong constants. I have defined “bias” along 
the lines of maximal bias as it makes things clearer. But a more mildly biased procedure that success-
fully finds the property that the bias is toward would also confirm a Many Objects hypothesis.
14.	Bostrom (2002), Juhl (2005), and Oppy (2006) all have discussions of the Inverse Gamber’s 
fallacy that are similar to mine in certain ways, but none of them are explicit about how selection 
effects work.
15.	Again, strictly speaking all I need is that we are more likely to exist in a universe with the right 
constants for life.
16.	“It is certainly not sufficient for us to exist in some universe, Beta, that Beta is fine-tuned, or even 
that Beta is qualitatively exactly as Alpha actually is. After all, if we postulate enough universes, the 
chances are that there exist several life-permitting universes, perhaps even universes with precisely 
the same initial conditions and fundamental constants as our universe, and containing human beings 
indistinguishable from us. But we do not inhabit those universes, other folks do” (White 2000, p. 268; 
italics in original).
17.	this is why the right constants sometimes seem to drop out of the fine-tuning argument. See White’s 
postscript in Manson (2003).
18.	I would like to thank the uBc Probability Reading Group, Branden fitelson, Josh Snyder, Elliott 
Sober, Mike titelbaum, an anonymous American Philosophical Quarterly reviewer, and audiences at 
the 2004 formal Epistemology Workshop at the university of texas, Austin; the Stanford-Berkeley 
Graduate conference 2004; and the Stanford Graduate Student Workshop 2003 for helpful comments 
and discussion on earlier drafts of this paper.
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